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When I set out to write, I had in mind first to give three examples of limitations on 
prediction based solely on information, followed then by a demonstration that even 
a modest amount of quantitative analysis with incomplete information can help to 
execute a military campaign. Analyses cannot eliminate wartime surprises but they 
can help to avoid the worst mistakes and steer military leaders toward better 
decisions.  
This audience knows the predictive power of models, the role of operations 
analysis, and the value of information are three big, interwoven subjects that are 
hard to winnow down to some essence. Prediction is a big subject, so I have 
limited these remarks to what I know best—the operational and tactical domains of 
conventional war. These few words are as much to stimulate reflection as to impart 
new wisdom. I’m going to conclude by describing what is too rarely done: 
compare quantitative campaign analysis done before a war, three wars in fact, with 
what actually transpired to show that useful—even critical—advice can be 
formulated very quickly to help decision makers. On one hand intense thinking 
about the war at hand is as important as a quantitative assessment. On the other 
hand it isn’t expert judgment that augments professional experience but some 
transparent, timely—but incomplete—quantitative analysis. 
PREDICTION FROM INFORMATION ONLY 
BLACK SWANS. Surely the most drastic book on prediction is N. N. Taleb’s The 
Black Swan, subtitled The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Taleb makes an 
entertaining case for the existence of unforeseeable events and the like, but his 
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advice is pretty trite: since by definition a black swan cannot be predicted, the most 
we can do is be ready for surprises, and responsive and adaptive when they occur.2  
GREY SWANS. More interesting are what might be called Grey Swans: surprising 
events of great consequence for which there was ex post facto evidence that got 
lost in a clutter of misinformation. In the commercial sector the recent burst of the 
housing bubble is the latest of many collapses brought on by “the madness of 
crowds” whose herd instinct overcame many clues of excesses in plain sight.3 Grey 
swans in the military domain are exemplified by the invasion of South Korea in 
1950, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, and the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 
in 1990. All three illustrate “surprises” that Monday morning quarterbacks have 
decried. After Pearl Harbor was alternatively described as a nefarious plot or the 
careless handling of information, Roberta Wohlstetter wrote what is to me the 
definitive interpretation in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. At the 
intellectual level she shows that it was not hard to miss the clues of what turned 
into a tactical disaster amidst information overload. At the emotional level one 
must see the need to hedge against human shortcomings in predicting future 
actions, while being careful not to cry wolf too often. 
EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT. What, then, about predictions by experts? 
There is a marvelous book by Philip E. Tetlock who found 284 self-proclaimed 
authorities who made a living commenting on political, international, or economic 
trends and were willing to participate in his study. The questions were the kind that 
could be answered “Better,” “Worse,” or “About the Same.” Over several years in 
the 1990’s Tetlock accumulated 82,361 answers in his data base. In 2003 Tetlock 
compared the predictions with actual results. Two years later he published his 
conclusions in a book entitled Expert Political Judgment. 4 
And the envelope, please. Well, it’s a fat envelope because Tetlock’s findings give 
all the interested parties a nuanced hearing. To keep this brief, I quote from a New 
Yorker book review: “[t]he experts performed worse than they would have if they 
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  Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Penguin Books, 2007 
3 I am referring, of course, to the classic book on economic bubbles, written by the Scotsman 
Charles Mackay and published in 1841: Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of 
Crowds. 
4 Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How good is it? How can we know? Princeton 




had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes. .  . Human beings 
who spend their lives studying the state of the world are poorer forecasters than a 
dart-throwing monkey.”5 Worse still, the experts tried to defend their wrong 
predictions with excuses like, “My timing was off,” or “An unforeseeable event 
interfered with what should have happened.” Tetlock also shows that non-experts 
who answered the same questions did better than the dart-throwing monkey. Not a 
lot better, but significantly more so than the experts. 
INFORMATION SUPPLEMENTED BY ANALYSIS 
These are examples of predictability based on information only. Tetlock’s Expert 
Judgment is full of statistics measuring the performance of experts, but as far as I 
know the experts were not allowed to do any analysis to supplement their opinions. 
So let us next make a slightly artificial distinction between information-based 
prediction and decision making that is assisted by quantitative assessment.  
WHY MILITARY ANALYSIS CANNOT PREDICT. As we begin the shift to 
military operations analysis, I refer to an essay by the late, great Air Force analyst, 
Clayton Thomas.6 In effect, he described model-based analysis as an IF-THEN 
statement. Two things, the model and its inputs, are on the IF side. Model and 
inputs together are processed to yield a result, the THEN side. If the model 
represented reality—which in campaign analysis it cannot—and if the data was 
precise—and in warfare the data is always “dirty” with errors—then the result 
would be an accurate prediction. We military analysts make no such claims. We 
say no more for the results than that when they are used wisely insightful 
conclusions can be reached and better decisions made. 
YET PREDICTION IS SOMETIMES UNAVOIDABLE. Although generally we 
don’t claim to predict combat outcomes, sometimes a decision maker must, in 
effect, do just that, and we must help him. A prominent example is procurement of 
warships that are anticipated to have 30 or even 40-year service lives. To see the 
impossibility of getting the designs right, however detailed and comprehensive the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Louis Menand, “Everybody’s An Expert,” New Yorker, December 5, 2005, pp. 98-100. 
6 Chapter 13, “Verification Revisited” in  Military Modeling for Decision Making, MORS 1997, 




analysis may be, reflect on the state of the world in 1972 and all that has changed 
since then to affect their prospective performance today. 
 Space permitting I could write at length, first, about how ships completed in 1972 
were designed much earlier with yet earlier technologies; second, that expensive, 
multi-purpose ships are a poor way to hedge against future grey swans; and third, 
that we are fortunate not to have been in a sea battle since 1945. Happily all our 
learning about war at sea in the missile age has been vicarious, except for the 
handful of embarrassing attacks we have suffered. The degree of success at 
prediction is in part measured by the decision maker’s expectations. Analytical 
methods and predictive power vary with tactics, technologies, testing, and whether 
the predictions concern policy, operations, logistics, procurements, or strategies. A 
fine book on the subject is MORS’ Military Modeling for Decision Making 
because it is comprehensive in distinguishing modeling and techniques for 
different defense-related purposes.7 
STRATEGIC PLANNING AND FORCE PROCUREMENT. An accurate, recent, 
38-page appraisal of predictive power when aided by extensive, even exhaustive, 
analysis was published in October 2011 by the distinguished statesman, Richard 
Dantzig.8 Quoting liberally from both Taleb and Tetlock, Dantzig shows the limits 
of model-assisted planning and why the limits have been inevitable when 
programming weapon systems for the future. His cure is difficult to implement, 
however, arguing Black Swan fashion for more nimble DoD and Congressional 
processes and acceptance of something less than the perfection demanded by those 
in government who metaphorically dodge and weave in a defensive crouch.  
In one respect his advice seems implementable. It is to work on simpler systems 
that can be designed and produced more quickly and be discarded after shorter 
lifetimes when geopolitical circumstances change, or when new technologies serve 
up either threats or opportunities. Although Dantzig does not say it this way, the 
clear implication is that top down solutions are unavoidable when expensive, long-
lived systems must fill capability niches and predictably will endure for the long 
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haul, for example multi-function orbiting satellites, or ballistic- missile-carrying 
submarines with well-designed, “failure proof” nuclear weapons for strategic 
deterrence. Otherwise bottom up, quickly implementable, relatively inexpensive 
systems that fill immediate needs by short-circuiting the procurement bureaucracy 
are the best way to recover from failures of prediction in national strategic 
planning, for example by the recent, rapid development of unmanned vehicles in 
both quantity and design variations. Falling somewhere in between were the 
successes at Kelly Johnson’s Lockheed Skunk Works, which responded quickly to 
fill needs perceived at the highest levels of the CIA. 
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS IN WARTIME. Barton Whaley’s Strategem is a good, 
quantitative book on methods of deception to achieve strategic surprise, how many 
false clues it takes to achieve it, how to enhance your chances of success, and why 
attempts to deceive haven’t cost much in resources.9 He gives historical examples, 
like the strategic surprise the Germans achieved in 1941 when they invaded the 
Soviet Union, and the Allies achieved in the Normandy Invasion. Whaley tells the 
wise deceiver how to succeed and the rewards that ensue. He shows that the 
victims of strategic deception behave much like Tetlock’s experts, who were 
blinded by their own overconfidence.  
TACTICS, TECHNOLOGY, AND TESTING. The measured performance 
predictions in peacetime exercises are caught up in the fog of war. Jon Sumida 
observes that the Royal Navy expected a hitting rate of 30% with the fleet’s big 
guns.10 At the Battle of Jutland the Germans achieved a rate of about 4% and the 
British 3½%.11 There were perfectly good reasons for this, but that is the point 
about prediction: there are always going to be ex post facto reasons your peacetime 
expectations will be wrong. The Englishman David Rowland has devoted much of 
his career to comparing ground combat exercise data with wartime data from 
similar battles. In one of his early papers he compared laser-instrumented, non-
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lethal experimental results with deadly combat results for similar environments in 
World War II. The experimental results overestimated the casualty production rate 
for tanks by a factor of two; for artillery duels by a factor of three; and for pure 
infantry actions by a factor of seven. Yes, a sevenfold overestimation of soldier 
performance. In effect, Rowland confirms S. L. A. Marshall’s highly controversial 
conclusions about the small number of American soldiers who fired their weapons 
when under fire in World War II. 
One of the most famous model-based predictions—I think predictions is the 
appropriate word—was by Frederick W. Lanchester who claimed the square law 
phenomenon would apply to air-to-air combat.12 He wished to show the advantage 
of numbers over quality in a new age of air warfare. But Lanchester was wrong. 
From evidence reported by Philip Morse and George Kimball in their famous 
Methods of Operations Research and in more detailed recent analysis by Niall 
Mackay,13 we know that through World War II the linear law applied in the air.14 
What Lanchester failed to see was that air combat is essentially dogfights and 
ambushes. The square law assumptions aren’t met. This was no theoretical matter. 
As Mackay shows, the top air campaign leaders in the Battle of Britain argued 
between massing defending fighters Lanchester square law fashion, or getting the 
fighters in the air early to be in the best position to win duels between single 
aircraft. As far as I can tell, the linear law still applies today. 
But I also tell our students of campaign analysis that the greatest number of kills 
doesn’t come from air-to-air combat. If they want to anticipate—predict as it 
were—which side will achieve air superiority then they must make a difficult 
estimate of how successful each side’s attempt will be to attack aircraft on the 
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13 For example, see Mackay, “Is Air Combat Lanchestrian?” in MORS’ Phalanx, Vol. 44, No. 4, 
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14  My Navy heritage demands that I say the square law was appropriate for battles at sea in the 
battleship era because square law conditions were met. Also, that two U. S. Navy officers, J. V. 
Chase and Bradley Fiske, invented the square law to describe the advantage of numbers 




ground, the way the Japanese surprised and destroyed MacArthur’s air force in the 
Philippines immediately after Pearl Harbor. 
Lest you think we are better off now with modern computers and powerful 
algorithms built into our best models, here is a more recent example. The U. S. 
Navy depends mightily for defense of the fleet on the Aegis missile system. Using 
data from controlled experiments at sea, one may calculate that if you shoot two 
missiles at an incoming missile and they are operationally and statistically 
independent of each other, and if you also add some point defense, you can expect 
to shoot down 90% or more of the attacking anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). 
What is the combat record? In battles at sea, warships of other states have averaged 
around 75% success in defending themselves from ASCMs. On the other hand, all 
of their success must be attributed to soft kill and point defense weapons, not to 
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). There are also several instances of warships that 
might have defended themselves but did not, illustrated by the recent successful 
missile attack on the Israeli warship Hanit. Navy analysts will also remember the 
Exocet hits on the defendable USS Stark and HMS Sheffield. In the entire record of 
more than 220 missiles fired on ships at sea starting in 1967, only one anti-ship 
missile has been shot down by a SAM. The record of U. S. Navy missile ships in 
combat is zero for two, if one counts the action of USS Vincennes in shooting 
down an Iranian airliner as a failure. As at Jutland, a careful examination of these 
missile era events shows there were reasons for the wartime results—pretty good 
reasons, too—but the important conclusion is that the fog of war almost always 
makes peacetime predictions too optimistic. Wartime surprises, though not exactly 
Black Swans, will always be present. 
OUR PRODUCT IS USEFUL INSIGHTS 
Now I am going to focus the lens on the domain of military grey swans when our 
tools are used for operational and tactical predictions. I hope to show that even 
though the predictive power of our analyses is less than we would wish, if we are 
suitably modest, do our work with the right objectives, and use appropriate 
measures of effectiveness, then our results and recommendations will be a 
powerful aid to decision makers. Indeed, I am going to arrive at conclusions so 




CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS. Campaign analysis is hard to do, and its predictive 
power is very much a matter of how demanding you want to be. For example, 
between the World Wars, the Naval War College played over 300 games, most at 
the campaign level and most against Japan. They were highly valuable by sobering 
our early optimism about its most important elements. After the war, Admiral 
Chester Nimitz wrote a famous letter saying except for kamikazes the games had 
accurately anticipated its major events, meaning I suppose, what happened in the 
drive through the Central Pacific that he oversaw. On the other hand, the 
Guadalcanal campaign, the shift from a battleship centric force to a carrier centric 
force, the vital contribution of American code breaking, and the drive by 
MacArthur up the New Guinea coast were vital aspects about which the games 
afforded no clues. In fact, after Pearl Harbor every class of warship changed its 
function—every class except mine sweepers.   
At the tactical level even the post mortems do not do justice to two factors that 
modern operations analysis might have revealed. After the Battle of Midway in 
June 1942, historians recognized four things that were necessary for the Americans 
to overcome a numerical inferiority of 75 ships to 25: code breaking; brilliant 
leadership by Nimitz, Fletcher, and Spruance; great courage in our naval aviators; 
and just plain good luck. But they missed two others. Until recently no historian 
had picked up on the value of radar. If the Japanese ships had had our air search 
radar then our surprise dive bomber attack could not have succeeded.15 Nor has any 
historian I have read identified the key role of Midway Island, which served as an 
immobile fourth American aircraft carrier, drawing away Admiral Nagumo’s 
attention and firepower at the critical time.16 
And yet, and yet . . . war games and fleet exercises schooled our carrier 
commanders before the Pacific war to know the best way to win—and the only 
way if outnumbered—was to detect the enemy first and get off a decisive first 
strike with every aircraft you had. Simple but elegant salvo equations, not yet 
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invented in 1942, would later match the results and “predict” with sufficient 
quantitative accuracy the outcomes of all five of the big carrier battles in the 
Pacific ex post facto.17 
Having in mind, then, that both Admiral Nimitz and the Midway historians ought 
to be given some slack, I will now describe three remarkable examples of the 
power and utility of our methods applied to campaigns, to show how analyses can 
help military leaders make better decisions and avoid the worst blunders. The 
examples are entertaining because they were performed by our young officer 
students in a course on joint campaign analysis. The students had to reach their 
conclusions very quickly, with maximum professional knowledge and minimum 
computation, because the class pretense—a realistic one—was that their decision 
maker needed their inputs within about 72 hours. In these ministudies, the students 
did not have time to construct a detailed “realistic” simulation. 
FORESIGHT AND HINDSIGHT IN WARS 
THE FALKLAND WAR. In the first example, the students fought the Falklands 
war on paper in 1982 before it started in fact. They had no inkling the General 
Belgrano was about to be sunk, taking the Argentine surface navy out of the war; 
or that Exocet missiles would be highly effective in destroying British ships; or 
that the Argentine ground forces would be thoroughly outclassed. To do justice to 
their insightful work would take several paragraphs, but I can report the bottom 
line very quickly. Neither side that fought had done such an analysis: early, fast, 
and basic. I believed then and still do that if they had, the Argentine Junta would 
have won the war, and Prime Minister Thatcher would have been more cautious 
about sailing 42 ships, essentially committing the U. K. to take back the Falklands. 
Why so? Because the fast, focused campaign analysis showed the Argentine air 
force, all 140 fighter attack-aircraft flown by capable pilots, could have with only a 
little foresight staged through Stanley airfield on East Falkland Island. It doesn’t 
take a detailed model or precise inputs to conclude that those aircraft, even when 
dropping iron bombs the old fashioned way, would have penetrated the 22 Harriers 
and other air defenses and put enough British ships out of action to force the fleet 
to abandon the invasion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





DESERT SHIELD. While my class was meeting in the fall of 2000 a big debate 
was raging over whether the U. S. and our Middle East partners could force 
Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait without a ground campaign. At the time many 
American Congressmen and pundits were arguing that this was possible. The 
charge to my students was to do a fast-turn-around mini-study to determine 
whether there was a campaign other than an invasion of Kuwait that would 
persuade Saddam Hussein to leave. After doing as much quantitative assessment as 
time permitted, the students concluded that if we wanted him out we must attack 
on the ground. This seems obvious in hindsight now, but it was not so at the time 
when the students made their appraisal. 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. Lastly I report on OIF. This student appraisal 
was done even faster than a ministudy, over a single weekend. We asked them how 
long it would take to win the war. Astutely they asked, “What do you mean by win 
the war?” Together we agreed that getting to Baghdad and toppling Saddam 
Hussein would constitute victory! I still think that was a suitably specific analysis 
goal, because everything after that comprised peacemaking operations, long and 
difficult though they turned out to be. The four student teams arrived at 
independent estimates. One team said it would take four weeks, one team said two 
to four weeks, and one team said two weeks to get there but we don’t know how 
long the city fighting will last. And the fourth team said three weeks. As you know, 
it took three weeks and a day to overthrow the regime. What our students could not 
predict, of course, was a sand storm that slowed the advance, and the remarkable 
luck and courage by some elite soldiers operating inside Baghdad. But the students 
had some crib notes to help them. They knew that research, most notably by the 
Army analyst Bob Helmbold, had concluded that the rate of advance of an army 
unopposed or against light opposition has been and still is about 25 miles a day. 
The students could scale back the movement rate appropriately in making their 
estimates—predictions, as it were. In actuality, our soldiers and Marines advanced 
300 miles to Baghdad in three weeks, which is an advance of 15 miles per day.  
OTHER DOMAINS 
I have emphasized the rewards and limitations of operational and tactical analysis 
to prepare for war. There is a lot more to the story. Before summing up, here is a 




ATTENUATING TERRORIST ATTACKS. I am not well informed on what kind 
of analysis would best supplement experience in fighting the perpetual war against 
terrorists. But I have read a fine paper entitled “How Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Can Mislead Terrorism Risk Analysis.” It is a warning against a methodology that 
cannot help and might hinder prediction and planning for homeland defense.18 
Authors Jerry Brown and Tony Cox see two problems with the methodology. One 
is putting confidence in the predictions of experts that are inputs to the analytical 
scheme. They are as suspicious of expert opinion as am I. The other problem is 
adapting a methodology—Probabilistic Risk Assessment—that has been effective 
for engineering analysis but is essentially a decision theory way to design against 
adverse natural events and risks. The authors point out that when the enemy is not 
nature but a ruthless attacker who wants to outwit us and penetrate our defenses, 
then “PRA” can actually help the enemy. The proper mindset is game theory which 
says we must do the best we can against the best he can do. The PRA methodology 
comes no closer to examining enemy choices and capabilities than to ask an expert 
the “probability of an attack” without regard for what the enemy observes us 
doing.  
All parties are in agreement that a new attack against our homeland will come 
some day. Predicting where and against what is the hard part that the PRA method 
intends to illuminate, but it cannot because the enemy has his own standards of risk 
versus reward. Brown and Cox “recommend shifting the emphasis of risk 
management from using experts to guess where risk might be greatest . . . to 
calculating where targeted investments will most improve the resilience of critical 
infrastructures.” It would seem this entails more attention to two things: First, 
where the additional safeguards have the biggest payoff, by adding some 
“inefficient” redundancies, e.g., to our excessively “efficient” but vulnerable 
electrical distribution system. Other grids distribute trains and trucks and 
petroleum and communications. Second, establish and practice procedures to 
recover after an attack, e.g., on the large container port at Long Beach, or the San 
Francisco-Oakland Bridge. Perhaps we have improved disaster recovery since the 
terrorist attack on the Twin Towers, but from the natural disasters I am aware of, 
such as the Indonesian tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, and an NPS-conducted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




experiment in inter-government cooperation in San Diego, preparing to act after an 
attack may be more productive than trying to prevent every attack. The two best 
ways to recover more quickly are probably by inexpensive drills to improve 
coordination among many agencies and levels of government, and readiness with 
emergency modes of communication. The general rule is “when there’s a war on, 
study the war.” That applies to war on terrorists, to the frequent use of unmanned 
vehicles in peacetime, and to the unending competition to safeguard and exploit 
cyber space. 
 MEASURING INFLUENCE TO AVOID WAR. The object of the cold war was to 
exert American influence without fighting the Soviet Union. We could never 
measure past success in predicting outcomes of our campaigns, including a highly 
predictable world disaster from a nuclear exchange, because there were none to 
study. The paradox is that the measurable predictions of successful analysis was 
that, year by year, deterrence held. 
As far as I know, in that long Cold War there was only one attempt to measure the 
predictive power of the many campaign analyses of a hot war. It occurred because 
an inspired analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses persuaded the CNA President 
to refight on paper a study his think tank had conducted for the Navy in 1965 of a 
war at sea conducted ten years hence. A study assumption was that the nuclear 
threshold would not be breached, in part because the American strategy was to 
confine the war to the oceans. The war was bloody enough among the combatants 
but massive civilian casualties were avoided. Around 1976 (I am speaking from 
memory) the analysis was repeated with the same military objectives but with the 
geopolitical environment updated, resulting in somewhat heavier demands on 
NATO forces, principally the U. S. Navy’s. Soviet forces were slightly greater than 
projected, and our estimates of Soviet maritime combat capabilities were about the 
same. On the other hand, between 1965 and 1975 the American fleet had become 
much smaller, and future combat capabilities projected to be in the fleet in 1975 
had not lived up to technical expectations when actually deployed. All inputs for 
the repeat campaign analysis seemed to indicate a worse outcome. Yet the amazing 
result of the campaign “fought” again on paper was about the same as for the 1965 
study projection and perhaps a little bit better. The reason was that in two or three 




developed to fight with them more effectively. Better tactics more than offset 
technological disappointments and a smaller fleet. 
But that interesting finding is peripheral to the two main points. First, it is highly 
useful to test our tactical and campaign analyses when their inputs and assumptions 
can be tested, yet it is hardly ever done. Second, the study results—even in 1965 
and despite their flaws—were decisively instructive. The purpose of the study was 
to test whether such a strategy was attractive for NATO. The answer was no. As 
with the Falklands scenario, it did not take exquisitely detailed analysis to see 
why—after the analysis had been done. The Soviet Union was a continental power 
that did not depend fundamentally on the oceans, but NATO was a maritime 
alliance for which control of the Atlantic was essential. The Soviets had too little at 
risk and NATO too much to make a war at sea strategy an effective deterrent. No 
more was heard of it, and NATO continued, wisely, to believe the central front in 
Europe was the critical region of interest.     
There is a modern analogy to the war at sea, as we contemplate ways to influence 
China, keep faith with friendly states in Asia, and avoid a big and economically 
disastrous war. Far from being unwise, a war at sea strategy in the Western Pacific 
looks feasible, because unlike the Soviet Union, Chinese influence and prosperity 
depend on the sea. Unlike the Soviet state, China has begun to build a fleet that can 
protect the movement of its shipping in the open ocean, shifting from a sea denial 
to a sea control navy. 
A brilliant recent article by Naval War College professors Toshi Yoshihara and 
James Holmes points out that one cannot construct a strategy unless its ends, ways, 
and means are well defined. Hence the state, namely China, must be identified as 
the strategy’s object.19 The ends have almost been established, because the 
Secretary of State and others have indicated our intention to put more emphasis on 
the Western Pacific. In effect, our policy experts have made a prediction about the 
future. Next must come an analysis of the best ways to sustain our influence there 
at an affordable cost. Yoshihara and Barnes have pointed out the limits of the new 
Air-Sea Battle concept and suggested other ways that can and should precede 
strikes on mainland China. U. S. and allied navy components would try to keep the 
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war at sea, exploit American maritime strengths, and demonstrate that China has 
the most to lose at each level of escalation—from maritime interdiction short of a 
full blockade all the way up to sinking Chinese warships and commercial vessels 
by American submarines in their home seas. Having the ways in hand to constrain 
every kind of confrontation, next comes further campaign analysis, testing and 
negotiation with allies and partners in Asia. We must ascertain the means: the 
types and numbers of forces in such a flexible strategy to fit the desires of China’s 
neighbors and worldwide commercial interests. No step is easy. For example, the 
same fleet must be suitable during times of cooperation, competition, 
confrontation, or conflict, and China has a say in what our ends must be. If all our 
ships are expected to have 30 and 40 year service lives, the challenge will be to 
construct one long-lived fleet for all circumstances. We don’t yet know whether 
Yoshihara and Holmes are right about the ways and means, but analysis to meet 
various conditions, not a prediction of a single future, is the way to find out. 
IN SUMMATION, WHAT TO BELIEVE ABOUT PREDICTION 
Black swans exist. The more we know of nature and human behavior, the more we 
find out we don’t know. Unavoidable surprises will continue. Black swans don’t 
have to be deceptive because by definition their surprise cannot be predicted. 
Grey swans in the military world are complicated because they are concealed by a 
perverse enemy who wants to surprise us. Pearl Harbor happened not just because 
it was an unlikely event and the clues about the attack were mishandled, but also 
because a clever enemy was doing his utmost to surprise us.  
Regrettably, grey swans are not likely to become rarer. The growth of knowledge, 
illustrated by the replacement of a written Encyclopedia Britannica with the 
electronic Wikipedia, exceeds our capacity to sort the information quickly. And in 
fast-moving military operations the enemy will constantly be trying to throw sand 
in our eyes. 
Expert judgment for national policy and military strategy is unreliable unless it is 
substantiated through the quantitative methods of operations research. 
Critical decisions can be greatly—even decisively—enhanced by quantitative 




claim to be—a prediction the future.  Useful insights come from wise application 
of dirty data processed in an appropriately simple model to yield results that are at 
once precise, inaccurate, and helpful. 
The Falklands War “72 hour” analysis by our campaign analysis students 
illustrated how decisive macro insights can be discerned in a very short time. 
Despite limited knowledge of how a war will unfold, quantitative analysis is 
powerful in uncovering the essential features of good and bad choices. 
The students’ “overnight” analysis ahead of Operation Iraqi Freedom showed two 
different things. On one hand, that an amazingly accurate estimate could swiftly be 
made of how long it would take to topple the Hussein regime. On the other hand, 
predictive power did not help anticipate that after defeating him there would be a 
long aftermath of difficult peacemaking. It is not new news that an enemy gets to 
choose, and sometimes his choices will seem not to be in his own best interests. 
Accurate predictions are useless if they are too late to help the decision maker. If 
he must act in 72 hours we must help him within 72 hours. I tell my students to 
follow the 1/3, 1/3, 1/3 rule of analysis. Given three days to complete the work, 
spend the first day figuring out how quantitative analysis can help make a decision, 
do the analysis on the next day, and take the third day to recover from your 
mistakes, answer his questions, or enrich the work. 
There are many variations of conflict in which military operations analysis can 
profitably supplement professional knowledge. One is when the battle goes on 
endlessly and there is more time to gather “combat” data, assess it, and apply it 
without expecting perfection, while remembering that the enemy is also adapting 
just as he does in conventional war. Another is when the object is not to prepare for 
war but to adapt new ends, ways, and means to retain influence over a prospective 
enemy in changing circumstances. The goal of analysis is to help decide what 
strategy and capabilities will be the best ones to keep the peace or contain the war. 
A general paradigm of all prediction is the IF-THEN statement with two parts to 
the IF side. To the extent that a model describes the circumstances and the data is 
accurate, the analysis process will make an accurate prediction. When the model is 




good enough, then the goal is not to predict the outcome but to help a decision 
maker do the best he can after adding his own wisdom to our quantitative analysis. 
I add one final thing worth remembering. We do not expend enough energy 
reexamining the value and effectiveness of our conclusions in hindsight. 
	  
